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Can You Get There from Here?:
How the Law Still Threatens King's
Dream
Timothy Sandefur*
[I]n regard to the colored people there is always more that is
benevolent, I perceive, than just, manifested towards us.
What I ask for the Negro is not benevolence, not pity, not
sympathy, but simply justice. . . . All I ask is, give him a
chance to stand on his own legs! ... If the Negro cannot live by
the line of eternal justice . . . the fault will not be yours, it will

be his who made the Negro, and established that line for his
government. Let him live or die by that. If you will only untie
his hands, and give him a chance, I think he will live.'

Introduction
On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks refused to leave her seat
2
on the orders of a White bus driver in Montgomery, Alabama.
Her arrest led to an almost year-long boycott against city buses led
by Martin Luther King, Jr. (Dr. King), 3 and a Supreme Court
decision, Gayle v. Browder,4 which struck down the city's
segregation ordinance.5 Less well known is the Baton Rouge bus
* College of Public Interest Law Fellow, Pacific Legal Foundation. J.D. 2002,
Chapman University School of Law; B.A. 1998, Hillsdale College. I would like to

dedicate this article to Clint Bolick, who has served as a constant inspiration to me.

We have it in our power to begin the world over again.... The birthday
of a new world is at hand, and a race of men ... are to receive their portion
of freedom from the events of a few months. The reflection is awful, and in
this point of view, how trifling, how ridiculous, do the little paltry cavilings
of a few weak or interested men appear, when weighed against the
business of a world.
THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 113-14 (Buccaneer Books 1976) (1776).
1. Frederick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants, in THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: RECONSTRUCTION AND AFTER, 164 (Philip S. Foner ed.,
1955).
2. DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 11-12 (1999).

3.
4.
Ala.
5.

See id. at 82.
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (mem.), aff'g Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D.
1956).
Id.
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boycott of 1953.6 Although it lasted just ten days, it provided a
model of organization that the Montgomery Improvement
Association (MIA) and its leader, Dr. King, would use two years
7
later in building the Montgomery boycott.
These boycotts were not just about segregated buses. The
story of their organization reveals a lesson about economic
regulations that, sadly, has still not been learned. Like so much of
the history of racial conflict in America, segregation involved a
complex mixture of law and social organization. One of the
greatest obstacles confronting both boycotts was the fact that the
network of drivers organized to provide alternative transportation
for the boycotters could not legally charge fares for rides.8 Taxicab
regulations in both Baton Rouge and Montgomery proved a
powerful tool in the hands of segregationists. Unfortunately, such
regulations continue to have a significant impact on the way racial
groups live their lives every day in America.
This Essay explores some of the racial and economic
implications of transportation regulations by examining the law's
power to manipulate economic relationships and the profound
effect this power has on the civil rights of Americans, of all races,
to pursue happiness. The Essay begins by discussing the threats
taxicab regulations posed to the success of the Baton Rouge and
Montgomery bus boycotts.
Part II surveys the history of
occupational licensing in America, particularly with respect to the
use of licensing statutes as a means of oppressing minorities, and
the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence with respect to
licensing schemes. In Part III, the Essay highlights the fallacies
in the modern judiciary's approach to analyzing licensing statutes
and constitutional protections of the right to work. The Essay
then focuses specifically on the impact licensing schemes have had
on minority involvement in the taxicab industry. Part V discusses
attributes of current licensing systems and addresses some of the
ways in which the current system should be challenged.
Ultimately, this Essay concludes that licensing schemes
perpetuate impermissible monopolies and repress minorities.

6. GARROW, supra note 2, at 27.
7. See id.
8. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 145
(1988).
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I. Licensing Laws Prolong the Segregationists' Fight
Against Civil Rights
The series of events that led to the Baton Rogue boycott
began when the city decided, in February 1953, to increase the city
bus fare. 9 On February 25, the city council passed Ordinance 222,
which abolished the former practice of explicitly reserving seats for
Whites on city buses, in response to lobbying by Black leaders. 10
But the bus company ignored the ordinance, and continued to
reserve the front rows of seats for Whites.1 1 Reverend T.J.
Jemison (Rev. Jemison) and others demanded the ordinance be
enforced.12 After a number of conflicts between passengers and
bus drivers, the drivers went on strike in June to protest
Ordinance 222.13 To quell the strike, the State's Attorney General
declared the ordinance void, as a violation of Louisiana
segregation laws. 14 The drivers went back to work, and Rev.
15
Jemison announced the beginning of the boycott.
The boycott was difficult to maintain because so many of
the city's Black workers relied on the buses to get to and from
work. 16 Eighty percent of the Baton Rouge bus company's riders
were Black, and while the riders resented segregation, they
(particularly the elderly) had no effective alternative. 17 Needing to
provide alternative transportation if he wanted to keep the boycott
alive, Rev. Jemison solicited volunteers to drive boycott
participants to their destinations in cars.18 He ran into a legal
obstacle. 19 Baton Rouge city ordinances required, and still require,
a taxicab license for any person paid in exchange for giving a
person a ride in a car, and also regulated the fares that drivers
could charge. 20 Getting a taxi license required the approval of the

9. Mary
Price,
Baton
Rouge
Bus
Boycott
http://www.lib.lsu.edu/special/exhibits/boycottlbackground.html
11, 2003).

Background,
at
(last visited Sept.

10. Id.; ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 18

(1984).
11. Price, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. MORRIS, supra note 10, at 18; Price supra note 9.
15. MORRIS, supra note 10, at 18; Price supra note 9.
16. MORRIS, supra note 10, at 19.
17. Price, supra note 9.
18. MORRIS, supra note 10, at 19.
19. Id.
20. BATON ROUGE, LA. PARISH CODE §§ 10:201-:218 (Municode
http:/flivepublish.municode.comll/1lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=mainj.htm&vid=lOl07 (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).

2003),
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city's regulatory commission. 21 Such commissions were routinely
staffed by political appointees, who it can be imagined, were not
especially sympathetic to desegregation. Such commissions are
generally much more congenial to already-existing taxi companies,
and have no incentive to create more competition in the taxi
market, let alone to assist in making political statements.
Rev. Jemison could not legally allow the passengers of his
makeshift driving network to pay their drivers, and volunteer
drivers could not afford to drive people around for free. Gas and
maintenance costs alone would have been prohibitive. 22 Rev.
Jemison's solution was to collect contributions at meetings of his
United Defense League (UDL), the organization he founded to run
the boycott, and then distributed the money to the drivers. 23 A
sympathetic gas station owner, Horatio Thompson, sold gas at cost
to the boycott drivers, but the system was still economically
weak. 24 The boycott lasted ten days before the UDL was forced to
agree to a compromise which maintained segregated seating on
25
the buses.
The Baton Rouge taxicab regulations immeasurably
strengthened the city's ability to withstand the boycott. Two years
later, Dr. King confronted the same obstacle when he led the
famous Montgomery boycott. He later recalled:
In the early stages of the protest the problem of transportation
demanded most of our attention. The labor and ingenuity that
went into that task is one of the most interesting sides of the
Montgomery story. For the first few days we had depended on
the Negro taxi companies who had agreed to transport the
people for the same ten-cent fare that they paid on the buses..
. . But . . . Police Commissioner Sellers mentioned in passing

that there was a law that limited the taxis to a minimum fare.
I caught this hint and realized that Commissioner Sellers
would probably
use this point to stop the taxis from assisting
26
in the protest.
Like Rev. Jemison, Dr. King solved the problem by collecting
money at church meetings and distributing it to participating
drivers. 27 This was no small feat since the Montgomery carpool

21. Id. at §10:204.
22. MORRIS, supra note 10, at 23.
23. Id.; Price, supra note 9.
24. Price, supra note 9.
25. GARROW, supra note 2, at 27; MORRIS, supra note 10, at 18, 24.
26. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Stride Toward Freedom, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 440-41 (James
Melvin Washington ed., 1986).
27. BRANCH, supra note 8, at 145.
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"would have to supply 20,000 rides, which worked out to more
than 130 rides a day for each of the volunteered cars." 28 Although
the MIA met this challenge, the burden was extreme and could
have been avoided entirely if Montgomery ordinances had not
29
required a forty-five cent minimum taxi fare.
As the Montgomery boycott approached the one-year mark,
the city government attacked it with "the legal weapon King's
lawyers had feared most," an injunction against the MIA for
running a transportation network without a license. 30 The MIA,
perhaps naively, actually sought a license for operating a
transportation system, but of course, city leaders denied this
request. 31 The licensing requirement posed such a serious threat
to the boycott that the MIA asked a federal court to prevent the
state from shutting the system down.3 2 Since federal courts
usually abstain from taking cases that are already proceeding in
state court, the federal court refused to interfere. 33 The state court
actually issued the injunction, 34 but fortunately for Dr. King, the
35
Supreme Court announced its decision in Gayle v. Browder,
36
striking down bus segregation, the same day.
The injunction alone would have destroyed the boycott; in
addition, city ordinances allowed the court to fine the MIA $15,000
for its lost taxes.3 7 In fact, the state court's injunction combined
with the slow implementation of the Browder decision meant that
for more than a month after the Supreme Court struck down bus
38
segregation, the Montgomery boycotters were forced to walk.
The boycotters did not want to return to the buses until the
Browder decision was enforced, but the injunction prevented them
from using alternative transportation. 39 These considerations led
28. Id. at 146.
29. Id. at 145.
30. Id. at 192.
31. GARROW, supra note 2, at 58-59; Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's
Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999,
1047 n.290 (1989).
32. Kennedy, supra note 31, at 1047.
33. Browder v. Montgomery, 146 F. Supp. 127, 128 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
34. City of Montgomery v. Montgomery Improvement Ass'n, No. 31075 (Cir. Ct.
Montgomery County, Ala. Nov. 13, 1956), reprinted in 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 123
(1957).
35. 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (mem.), affg Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D.

Ala. 1956).
36. Id.; Kennedy, supra note 31, at 1047.
37. BRANCH, supra note 8, at 193.
38. Id. at 194.

39. Id. Branch provides another example of the political power behind licensing
laws. In 1959, Tennessee officials, seeking to break the building momentum of the
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one commentator to state that although
[t]he Montgomery Bus Boycott has attained a secure and
honored niche in the Nation's public memory . . . [t]he

concerted withdrawal of Negro patronage is not what finally
desegregated the buses; successful litigation constituted the
decisive action ....
[T]he boycott on its own did not succeed in
inducing the40 political authorities to make any substantial
concessions.
This is not meant to denigrate the boycotts. On the contrary,
only remarkable community spirit allowed the Montgomery
boycott to survive. It is a testament to the dedication of thousands
of people whose names are no longer remembered, in large part
the elderly and poor, who chose to walk rather than be subjected
any longer to the demeaning treatment of segregation.
But
Montgomery authorities held the most powerful trump card: the
power to shut down the MIA's alternative transportation' network.
As Ralph Abernathy later recalled, "[w]ith the machinery of the
law in their control, the white establishment could make our
[boycott] so costly that we might eventually have to give up the
struggle or else spend a good portion of our lives in jail."4 1 That
same machinery had forced the leaders of the 1953 boycott in
Baton Rouge to agree to a compromise solution. Had the City of
Montgomery used its weapons more effectively, the boycott likely
would not have lasted as long as it did or had the effects that it
had.

II. Tradition of Discouraging Monopolies in Employment
Gradually Erodes
A. Colonies Follow British Policy of Disfavoring
OccupationalLicenses
Taxicab licenses are a type of occupational licensing, a
government mechanism that grew to prominence in the period
following the American Civil War. 42 Before the 1870s, courts
restricted the government's ability to regulate professions because
civil rights movement, shut down the Highlander Folk School, where many civil
rights activists had trained in nonviolent protest techniques-by charging the
school for serving liquor without a license. The school had provided students with a
cooler full of refreshments, including beer, and put out a jar for contributions. This
was all the state needed, under the liquor licensing laws, to seize the school, revoke
its charter, and auction off all its assets. Id. at 289-90.
40. Kennedy, supra note 31, at 1054.
41. RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, AND THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN 165-66

(1989).
42. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 397 (1973).
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courts saw such regulations as infringements on citizens' right to
earn a living. 43 As early as the seventeenth century, courts had
held that while government could regulate in order to protect
consumers, it could not do so in a manner that reduced
competition or infringed on the right of tradesmen to pursue their
44
trade.
As the Court of King's Bench said in 1610, "[Tlhe King may
erect guildam mercatoriam, i.e., a fraternity or society or
corporation of merchants, to the end that good order and rule
should be by them observed for the increase and advancement of
45
In
trade and merchandise, and not for the hindrance46 of it."
47
plasterers,
upholsterers,
that
held
courts
the
subsequent years,
and dancing teachers 48 did not have to be licensed in order to
practice their trades. At common law, explained England's Chief
Justice, Sir Edward Coke, "it was lawful for any man to use any
trade thereby to maintain himself and his family; this was both
Although individual
lawful, and also very commendable." 49
unregulated, for "if a
entirely
not
freedom to practice a trade was
the
which he hath no
in
man will take upon him to use any trade,
skill; the law provides a punishment for such offenders, and such
persons," 50 the law upheld the right of individuals to enter a 51trade
subject only to the government's power to protect consumers.
Lord Coke was the leading opponent of royal monopolies in
the seventeenth century. 52 King James I, to whom Coke was a
constant pest, frequently used royal power to grant monopolies to
his friends and supporters.5 3 These monopolies were similar to
today's patents; they made it illegal for anyone to compete with
the owner of the monopoly, and they were granted on a variety of
54
things, including, in one case, the making of playing cards.

43. See Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 207, 22431 (2003) (discussing courts' protection of the right to occupational freedom from
1787 through 1870).
44. Id. at 213.
45. City of London's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 658, 663 (K.B. 1610).
46. Allen v. Tooley, 80 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1055-60 (K.B. 1614).
47. Les Brick-Layers & Tilers v. Les Plaisterers, 81 Eng. Rep. 871, 872 (K.B.
1624).
48. Robinson v. Groscourt, 87 Eng. Rep. 547, 547-50 (K.B. 1695).
49. Tooley, 80 Eng. Rep. at 1055.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See Sandefur, supra note 43, at 210-17.
53. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE OF

SIR EDWARD COKE 436-37 (1957).
54. Darcy v. Allen, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1260-61 (K.B. 1602). See Jacob L. Corre,

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 22:1

Nobody except the person with royal permission was allowed to
make or sell cards. 55 The court struck down this monopoly, and
Coke explained that:
if a graunt be made to any man, to have the sole making of
Cards, or the sole dealing with any other trade, that graunt is
against the liberty, and freedome of the Subject, that before
did, or lawfully might have used that trade, and consequently
against [the Magna Carta].
Generally all monopolies are against this great Charter,
freedome of the
because they are against the liberty and
6
Subject, and against the Law of the Land.
Coke, and the generations that followed him, were highly
suspicious of economic regulations because they often were used to
give market preferences to those whom the government wanted to
support.5 7 The common law courts struck down these laws as
58
violations of the right to pursue lawful occupations.
Likewise, the founders of the United States were wary of
economic regulations because they were often perverted into a tool
for making it illegal for entrepreneurs to compete, or for customers
to shop elsewhere. 5 9 As James Madison stated:
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it,
where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny
to part of its citizens [the] free use of their faculties, and free
choice of their occupations ....

What must be the spirit of

legislation where a manufacturer of linen cloth is forbidden to
bury his own child in a linen shroud, in order to favour his
neighbour who manufactures woolen cloth; where the
manufacturer and wearer of woolen cloth are again forbidden
the (economical use of buttons of that material, in favor of the
manufacturer of buttons of other materials!60

Such power would become an important prize in the political game
since it gave politicians the power to make or break a person's
The Argument, Decision, And Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261, 126163 (1996).
55. Darcy, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1260.
56. 2 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND 47 (1642).

57. See Malla Pollack, The Owned Public Domain: The ConstitutionalRight Not
To Be Excluded-Or the Supreme Court Chose the Right Breakfast Cereal in Kellogg
v. National Biscuit Co., HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 265, 289-90 (1999).
58. See, e.g., Robinson v. Groscourt, 87 Eng. Rep. 547, 547-50 (K.B. 1695), Les
Brick-Layers & Tilers v. Les Plaisterers, 81 Eng. Rep. 871, 872 (K.B. 1624), Allen v.
Tooley, 80 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1055-60 (K.B. 1614); see further Timothy Sandefur,
Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday's Rationality Review
(forthcoming, 2004).
Isn't Enough, 24 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 59. JAMES MADISON, Property, in MADISON: WRITINGS 515, 516 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1999).
60. Id.
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right to earn a living.
B. Freed Slaves Afforded Equal Rights Through
ConstitutionalProtections
Of course, in Coke's and Madison's day, the right to earn a
living extended only to White men, not slaves.6 1 But after the
Civil War, Radical Republicans in Congress sought to extend that
right to the freedmen. 62 One of the most important parts of their
program was the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,63 which
stated that
all persons born in the United States . . .of every race and
color . . . shall have the same right .. .to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
of person and property, as is
proceedings for the security
64
enjoyed by white citizens.
President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Act on the grounds
that Congress had no authority to require states to extend these
protections. 65 But Congress overrode Johnson's veto, 66 and, to
ensure the Act would not be struck down by the courts, passed the
67
Fourteenth Amendment.
The first section of the Amendment contains four important
clauses.68 The first declares that all persons born in the United
States, and not subject to a foreign government, are citizens of the
United States. 69 The second prohibits any state from making or
enforcing "any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." 70 The third requires
states to extend the equal protection of the laws to all people in
their jurisdiction. The fourth prohibits states from taking a
61. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (slaves were not even considered individuals,
let alone citizens).
62. See, e.g., 43 CONG. REC. app. 363 (1874).
63. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
64. Id.
65. EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 81-83 (1871) (detailing the

Congressional vote to override Presidential veto and President Johnson's comments
regarding the constitutionality of the amendment).
66. Id. at 74.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

CIVIL
68.
69.
70.

RIGHTS 4-5 (1977).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
See id.
Id.

§

1; MILTON R. KONVITZ, THE CONSTITUTION AND

§ 1.
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71
person's life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
While the last two clauses were particularly important during the
Civil Rights movement, consider for a moment the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.
What are "Privileges and Immunities"? 72 The phrase also
appears in Article IV of the Constitution, where it applies to the
federal government.7 3 In an early case involving Article IV,
Justice Bushrod Washington explained that Privileges and
Immunities include "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such
restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general
good of the whole." 74 The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
relied on Justice Washington's explanation when they added a
Clause
to
the
Fourteenth
Privileges
and
Immunities
Amendment. 75 According to Senator John Sherman, Congress
intended the Privileges and Immunities Clause to protect the
common law rights of Americans.76 Representative John Bingham
explained that the Clause protected "the liberty ... to work in an
honest calling and contribute by your toil in some sort to the
support of yourself, to the support of your fellowmen and to be
secure in the enjoyment of the fruits of your toil." 77 Senator W. T.
Hamilton asked rhetorically,
Has not every person a right to carry on his own occupation, to
secure the fruits of his own industry, and appropriate them as
best suits himself, as long as it is a legitimate exercise of this
right and not vicious in itself, or against public policy, or
morally wrong, or against the natural rights of other?'
In short, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended, in part, to
stop states from depriving people of this essential freedom.

C. Courts Quickly Undermine the Newly Established
Protections
Ratified in 1872, the Amendment almost immediately
became the subject of litigation in what came to be known as the
71. See id.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. U.S. CONST. art V, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
74. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
75. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).

76. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872).
77. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 86 (1871).

78. 43 CONG. REC. app. 363 (1874).
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Slaughter-House Cases.79 Louisiana passed a law requiring all
butchering in New Orleans to be done, not at private butcher
80
The monopoly
shops, but at a single state-owned butcher shop.
put many butchers out of business; so they sued arguing that the
law violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause by depriving
them of their right to earn a living. 8 ' The Supreme Court rejected
the butchers' argument.8 2 Writing for the majority, Justice
Samuel Miller asked rhetorically, "[w]as it the purpose of the
fourteenth amendment ... to transfer the security and protection
of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to
the Federal government?"8 3 Miller answered his own question
with a resounding no.8 4 Although the Court recognized the right
to earn a living, it regarded that right as deriving from state, not
federal, citizenship.85 The two kinds of citizenship, and the two
kinds of rights, are distinct from each other, and the Fourteenth
Amendment only protected the "privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States."8 6 Therefore, the Amendment did not
allow federal protection of the right to earn a living since it was a
8 7
right incident to state citizenship.
The tortured interpretation in the Slaughter-House Cases
completely undermined the purpose of the Fourteenth
Congress passed the Amendment precisely to
Amendment.8 8
create federal protection for individual rights, particularly as
protection against state legislatures, which in the post-Civil War
era were devising ever more ingenious ways to keep freed slaves
from attaining equality.8 9 The Slaughter-House Cases reduced the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to what dissenting Justice
Stephen Field called "a vain and idle enactment, which
accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress

79. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 36-130 (1873).
80. See id. at 38.
81. Id. at 45-46.
82. Id. at 83.
83. Id. at 77.
84. Id.
85. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77.
86. Id. at 74. But see John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1415 (1992) (suggesting that Justice Miller, who wrote
the majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, was misled, in part, by the
italicization used by the printers of the U.S. Reports). Little things mean a lot!
87. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74-75.
88. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872).
89. See David S. Bogen, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Reflections from the Admission of Maryland's First Black Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV.
939, 943 (1985).
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and the people on its passage."90 Under the Court's interpretation,
the Clause merely prevented states from interfering with rights
granted by the federal government. 9 1 However, the Supremacy
Clause already did this. 92 The Slaughter-House Cases effectively
erased the Privileges and Immunities clause from the
Constitution. 93 Since 1872, only one Supreme Court case has
struck down a law for conflicting with the Privileges and
Immunities clause. 94 Although Judge Robert Bork has called the
Slaughter-House Cases a
"narrow
victory
for judicial
moderation," 95 the truth is that in the Slaughter-House Cases, the
Court managed effectively to overrule an entire constitutional
amendment. 96 To reduce an entire clause of the Constitutionparticularly a clause of the extremely important Fourteenth
Amendment-to a practical nullity was an act of extreme judicial
97
activism.
The poison tree of the Slaughter-House Cases promptly bore
fruit. Only four years later, the Court relied on the SlaughterHouse Cases to undermine federal authority to prosecute civil
rights crimes in United States v. Cruikshank.9s Cruikshank arose
from a truly unbelievable act of racial violence called the "Colfax
Massacre," in which more than 250 Black Louisianans were
murdered by a White mob that burned down the building in which
they had assembled, and shot those who tried to escape the
flames. 99 Only a handful of the murderers were convicted, 100 but
the Supreme Court reversed their convictions, 10 1 holding
inapplicable the Civil Rights Act of 1870,102 which protected the
"free exercise and enjoyment of rights and privileges 'granted and
secured' to [citizens] ... by the constitution and laws of the United

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

The Slaughter.House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 74.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999).

95. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 39 (1990).

96. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 96.
97. See Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or
Immunities Clause To Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and the
Federal Government, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 34 (1998).
98. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
99. Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of
Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2113, 2151-52 (1993).
100. Id. at 2153.
101. Id. at 2155-56.
102. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (1870) (current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)).
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States." 10 3 The right to assemble peaceably and the right not to be
deprived of life or liberty without due process are rights incident to
state citizenship, said the Court, and therefore, the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress no power to protect that right against
the states.10 4 Since the duty of protecting lives "rests alone with
the States, [i]t is no more the duty or within the power of the
United States to punish for a conspiracy to falsely imprison or
murder within a State, than it would be to punish for false
imprisonment or murder itself."'1 5 Cruikshank and the SlaughterHouse Cases effectively gutted federal authority to protect former
slaves from, respectively, criminal or civil violations of their rights
Decades passed before the Court
by their home states. 106
developed a theory to protect individual rights from state
interference by using, not the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
but the Due Process Clause instead. 10 7 By that time, the Civil
Rights Cases10 s and Plessy v. Ferguson'0 9 had reduced the
Reconstruction commitment to civil rights to a bitter joke.
D. States Assert Licensing Authority to Oppress Minorities
The Slaughter-House decision encouraged state legislatures,
and state constitutional conventions,"10 to enact increasing
government controls over businesses and occupations in the
following decades. 1 ' The Michigan Supreme Court noted in 1889
that it was
quite common in these latter days for certain classes of
citizens-those engaged in this or that business-to appeal to
the government ...to aid them by legislation against another
class of citizens engaged in the same business, but in some
other way. This class legislation, when indulged in, seldom
benefits the general public, but nearly always aids the few for
whose benefit it is enacted." 2
Soon, many American jurisdictions began using the power of
government regulation to prevent economic competition from the

103. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548.
104. Id. at 553.
105. Id. at 554.
106. See id. 554-55.
107. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-91 (1896).
108. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
109. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
110. Almost all states called constitutional conventions in the 1870s and 1880s.
See FRIEDNAN, supra note 42, at 302-18.
111. See Bogen, supra note 89, at 942-44.
112. Chaddock v. Day, 75 Mich. 527, 531-32 (1889).
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former slaves. 113 Louisiana was particularly bold and "takes some
sort of prize for fickleness," going through three state constitutions
after the Slaughter-House Cases was decided. 114 But fickle as
some of these constitutions were, they never wavered from one
particular goal: disenfranchising the freedmen, politically and
15
economically. 1
Maryland soon prohibited Blacks from practicing law,
recognizing that "the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
privileges and immunities clause [in the Slaughter-House Cases]
was a response to, and a rejection of, congressional claims of power
to prohibit racial discrimination."'1 6 This statue was only one of
what became a flood of licensing statutes that were either
explicitly intended to prevent Blacks from earning a living, or
which had that effect. 17 Courts further compounded the problem
by deferring to the decisions of licensing boards, even when those
boards acted with racial animus."18 For example, Maryland courts
upheld the licensing of plumbers in 1890; by the 1950s only two of
the state's 3,200 licensed plumbers were Black. 1 9
Laws
regulating the barbering trade present another striking example of
the use of state power to disenfranchise Blacks. 120 Although in the
1890s more than twenty percent of America's barbers were Black,
that number dropped dramatically over the next three decades as
cities began to use their regulatory and licensing power to exclude
Black competition.121 A 1927 Georgia Supreme Court decision to
strike down such a regulation on Equal Protection grounds was
most unusual, and despite its holding, the court took pains to
rationalize the legitimacy of segregation laws. 122
Thus,
government regulatory power, strengthened by judicial deference,
gave segregationists their most efficient tool:

113. David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use of
Government Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV.

89, 89-92 (1994).
114. FRIEDMAN, supra note 42, at 303.
115. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS 251-53 (1974).

116. See Bogen, supra note 89, at 943.
117. Bernstein, supra note 113, at 98.
118. See, e.g., People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of the City Prison, 144 N.Y.
529, 539 (1895).
119. Bernstein, supra note 113, at 98. See also DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE
PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS AND THE COURTS
FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 36 (2001).

120.
121.
122.
merely

Bernstein, supra note 113, at 99-103.
Id. at 99.
Chaires v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 755, 769-70 (1927) (Segregation laws "are
regulatory and do not destroy nor impinge upon property rights").
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White officials, reflecting their own personal biases as well as
the social dynamics that placed them in office, exercised
discretion in ways that almost invariably slighted black
interests. What this meant concretely was that blacks
typically received inferior public goods and services. The
separate and unequal character of segregated public schooling
has been well publicized. But what has not been adequately
appreciated is the all-inclusive extent of systematic inequity.
From sewer service to lighting to the upkeep of streets to law
enforcement to recreational facilities, blacks could realistically
123
expect to receive fewer resources because of racial bias.
Of course, not all economic regulations were passed by racist
But because racial
groups trying to eliminate competition.
minorities are, by definition, in the minority, their voice in the
regulatory process is limited. 124
E. Brief JudicialReprieve for the Right to Earn a Living
In the years following the Slaughter-House Cases, the
Supreme Court began once again to restrict government authority
In Allgeyer v.
to interfere with the right to earn a living.
Louisiana,125 the Court recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the right to earn a living, but found such
protection stemmed from the Due Process Clause rather than the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 126 Over the next few decades,
the Court struck down a number of economic regulations under
what came to be called "economic substantive due process". 127 In
the most famous of these cases, Lochner v. New York,' 2s the Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not allow the State of
New York to forbid bakers from working overtime. 129 Any kind of
labor, said the Court,
may possibly carry with it the seeds of unhealthiness. But are
we all, on that account, at the mercy of legislative majorities?
A printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a
cabinetmaker, a dry goods clerk, a bank's, a lawyer's or a
physician's clerk, or a clerk in almost any kind of business,
123. Kennedy, supranote 31, at 1007.
124. JAMES BUCHANON & GEORGE TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 183-88
(1962).
125. 165 U.S. 578 (1896).
126. See id. at 591.
127. See Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95, 100-04
(1999); see also BERNARD SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM THE MAGNA CARTA TO
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 267 (2001) (showing that despite the focus in this
time period, the clause had actually been interpreted as including a substantive
component long before).
128. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
129. Id. at 59.
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would all come under the power of the legislature, on this
assumption. No trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one's
130
living, could escape this all pervading power ....
In fact, the statute in Lochner was part of an attempt by the
owners of new, mechanized bakeries to shut down competition
from small, upstart bakeries. 131 Since the mechanized bakeries
could run all night, the law against working overtime only affected
the smaller bakeries that made their goods by hand. 32 These
133
bakeries were primarily staffed by recently arrived immigrants.
The Court also employed the Equal Protection Clause in
protecting the right of livelihood against legislation enacted by
hostile majorities. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,134 for instance, the
Supreme Court struck down a San Francisco ordinance aimed at
shutting down the Chinese laundries in the city.135 But Yick Wo
did not end such practices; rather, racist bureaucracies just sought
out more clever methods of achieving the same end. For example,
they devised statutes which avoided mentioning race, but were
still aimed at disfavored races.1 36 As Justice Potter Stewart once
said, "[slometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating
1 37
things that are different as though they were exactly alike."
Arguing a case before the Supreme Court is a huge undertaking.
One can imagine that many entrepreneurs burdened by a racially
discriminatory licensing restriction instead just gave up, or tried
to run a business under the table.1 38 In any case, the power to
regulate was, and remains, the power to destroy. That power has
frequently been used against racial minorities.
III. The Devastating Legacy of Rational Basis Scrutiny
In a series of cases in the 1930s, the Supreme Court
139
repudiated the doctrine of economic substantive due process.

130. Id.
131. Alan Mees , Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and
the Mistranslationof the Due Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 42 (1999).
132. Id. at 40-43.
133. See PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL

12 (1998).
134. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
135. Id. at 368-69; see also Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[The
law in Yick Wo] was held to be a covert attempt on the part of the municipality to
make an arbitrary and unjust discrimination against the Chinese race.").
136. See Bernstein, supra note 113, at 91.
137. Jenness v. Fortson; 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
138. See Bernstein, supra note 113, at 40 (describing the black market in the
barber trade that sprang up as a result of discriminatory licensing).
139. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
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Although the Court has never overruled Yick Wo, it embraced an
alternative theory, employing varying levels of scrutiny.140 Under
this theory, which prevails today, government regulation, of
certain rights called fundamental rights or of groups called suspect
classes, is required to satisfy the legal test of strict scrutiny, while
regulations of rights such as property rights or the right to earn a
living, need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivably
legitimate government purpose.14 1 The bottom line is that courts
defer to the legislature's judgment as it relates to government
intrusions on those rights that were actually the primary concern
of the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment and the original civil
rights acts. The result of the Supreme Court's adoption of the
rational relationship test is today's regulatory nightmare, giving
the government authority to manipulate the transportation
market at the behest of the politically powerful. 142
A. "Rational"Bureaucracy in Action
Adoption of the rational basis test has often resulted in
perverse consequences for minorities given the low threshold
143
required for government action to be deemed reasonable.
Cornwell v. Hamilton144 illustrates the court's analysis using the
rational basis test when reviewing licensing laws. 145 In Hamilton,
JoAnne Cornwell (Dr. Cornwell), chairwoman of the Africana

(deferring to the legislature's rationale for imposing economic regulations on milk
products); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (presuming
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (rebutting the idea of freedom of contract by upholding
a minimum wage for women and children).
140. See U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (applying a
rational basis test when asking whether the railroad company's retirement plan
violated the Equal Protection Clause); Craig v. Boren, 492 U.S. 190 (1976) (utilizing
an intermediate scrutiny standard in regards to classifications based on race);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (stating strict scrutiny should be used in
issues dealing with the suspect classification of race).
141. See also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 605-09 (14th ed. 2001) (discussing how a court determines if a law is
reasonably related to the legislative intent).
142. See WALTER E. WILLIAMS, THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS 67-73 (1982); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 491-93 (1997).
143. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(upholding a law which had a discriminatory effect because there was no
discriminatory motive).
144. 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999). In an earlier decision, Cornwell v.
Cal. Bd. of Barbering and Cosmetology, 962 F. Supp. 1260, 1277 (S.D. Cal. 1997),
the court dismissed some counts filed against the California Board of Barbering
and Cosmetology on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
145. Id.
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Studies Department at San Diego State University, decided to
preserve a fascinating bit of Black history, in the form of African
hair-braiding techniques, some of which date back several
centuries. 14 6 To preserve this living cultural identity, Dr. Cornwell
started Sisterlocks, a business that both braids women's hair and
teaches the techniques to others.1 47 She ran up against a problem:
California law mandated she get a cosmetology license, which
requires as much as $7,000 and 1600 hours of classes in a variety
of hairstyling techniques inapplicable to hairbraiding. 148 The
required curriculum included classes on the proper use of hairtreatment chemicals, but Dr. Cornwell's hairbraiding techniques
used no chemicals.1 49 The regulations also required her to learn
in what the state referred to as
and demonstrate proficiency
"mainstream hairstyling."15 0 As the court explained, "[t]his places
an almost insurmountable barrier in front of anyone who seeks to
practice African hair styling. [Students] are required to spend
nine months attending a cosmetology school, at a cost of $5,000 5''
$7,000, learning skills, 96% of which, they will never use. l 1
Worse, the hairstyles that the law required Dr. Cornwell to learn
were styles mostly worn by Whites.1 52 As the Plaintiffs argued,
"African hair styling is uniquely performed on hair that is
physically different-alternatively described as tightly textured or
coily hair-and that this physical difference is genetically
determined to be in close correlation with race."1 53 But the
hairstyling
embraced
requirements
board's
cosmetology
races. 15 4
other
of
hair
the
for
appropriate
more
techniques
Although the court found no evidence that the curriculum had
actually been written with the intent to exclude Black hairstyling
techniques, it noted "the obvious racial impact" of the
regulations.1 55 Fortunately the court held that these requirements
were unconstitutional, even under the lenient rational basis
test.156
Even absent racial animus, bureaucracies are inherently

146. VIRGINIA POSTREL, THE FUTURE AND ITS ENEMIES 114.15 (1998).

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Cal. Bd., 962 F. Supp. at 1264.
POSTREL, supra note 146, at 115.
Cal. Bd., 962 F. Supp. at 1264.
Id. at 1275.
Id.
Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d. 1101, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1118.
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conservative and frequently stifle innovation. A new business idea
originates among a small group of entrepreneurs, or even a single
one, but the opportunity to implement that idea is then
complicated by the inertia of regulatory agencies. To cite one odd
example, the famous chef Wolfgang Puck never convinced federal
authorities to permit him to label his original specialty pizzas
"pizzas" because, under federal regulations, the word "pizza" could
not be used unless the pie had tomato sauce on it.157 For years he
has been forced to add tomato to his pesto sauce in order to sell his
frozen pizzas in grocery stores.158 Puck, a wealthy, world-famous
innovator, had a hard enough time attempting to convince a
regulatory agency to accept his innovation in the absence of racial
hostility. Imagine the fate of a Black man in 1900, who, having
devised some clever new business technique, was legally required
to go before a board comprised of segregationists to have his idea
certified before going into business. He would most likely have
found it impossible. How many ideas have been lost before ever
being born-have, as Langston Hughes put it, dried up like a
raisin in the sun 159-because their originators could not get a
government license?
B. Public Choice Problem
Under the rational basis test, courts defer to the decisions of
regulatory agencies based on the assumption that if people do not
like the agency's performance, the people have the power to
remove decision-makers through the electoral process. But racial
minorities, have no such power.
The judiciary's approach fails to account for what economists
call the "public-choice" problem.1 60 When a government has power
to confer economic benefits on people, that power becomes a
valuable prize in the political contest. 61 If a bureaucracy can give
157. Carole Sugarman, Who's Minding the Store? The Seemingly Senseless
Division of FederalLabeling Authority, WASH. POST, May 11, 1988, at El.
158. See id.; POSTREL, supra note 146, at 105; Marian Burros, Environmental
Politics Is Making the Kitchen Hotter, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1992, at C1.
159. See Langston Hughes, Harlem, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY
1063 (1st ed., 1970).
160. See generally John 0. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Its Decline:
A Public Choice Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 195 (1997) (explaining
that Framers of the Constitution intended to control special interest group power
within in a public choice framework through a limited federal government and the
separation of powers).
161. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCO, supra note 124, at 286-87 (discussing the rise of
special interest groups as a result of the growing profitability of the political
process).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 22:1

X dollars worth of benefits to whomever wins control over that
bureaucracy, political groups will find it in their interest to spend
anything up to X in order to gain control. 162 As a result,
government power falls into the hands, not of the most deserving,
but of the most politically adept. 163 Wealthy or powerful groups
capture government authority and use it to live at the expense of
those less able to compete politically: people who cannot muster
as many votes, or who are the targets of racist hostility.
IV. Taxicab Licensing as a Racial Issue
The government's regulatory power became pivotal to those
running the bus boycotts of 1953 and 1955 because the taxicab
industry is one of the most heavily regulated industries in the
United States. 16 4 Driving a cab requires few specialized skills and
is a common entry-level job for immigrants and members of the
lower class.165 Nevertheless, licenses to operate taxicabs are
extremely difficult to obtain, and the taxi market is rife with racial
conflict. 166 The limousine industry is an area where, in some
remaining jurisdictions, the law "transparently regulate[s] ... for
the specific purpose of limiting competition and protecting an
167
incumbent oligopoly."'
One striking example is Miami, Florida, where the taxi
market is not only monopolized, but extremely hazardous. Some
areas of Dade County-for instance, the inaptly named "Liberty
City"-are so dangerous most cab companies refuse to enter the
neighborhood. 168 Society Cab, the sole Black-owned and Blackoperated cab company in Dade County, is usually the only cab
company that will serve Liberty City. 169 "The other company takes
them to Biscayne Boulevard,"'170 one driver said, "We take them

162. See id.
163. See id.
164. Steven Oxenhandler, Taxicab Licenses: In Search of a Fifth Amendment,
Compensable Property Interest, 27 TRANsP. L.J. 113, 319-20 (2000).
165. See Lee A. Harris, The Freedom to Contractfor A Ride, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 195, 213 (2002).
166. See, e.g., Rick Bragg, For Black Taxi Company in Miami, a County Law Is
the Latest Threat, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1999, at A20.
167. Robert M. Hardaway, Taxi And Limousines: The Last Bastion of Economic
Regulation, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 319, 319 (2000).
168. See Bragg, supra note 166. When a reporter asked drivers from the Society
Cab Company to name drivers they knew who had been shot to death while driving
in the neighborhood, "[tihe men could not recall all the names of the drivers who
were killed in robberies in the last 20 years." Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.

CAN YOU GET THERE FROM HERE?

2004]

from there." 171 "The only Hispanic driver to ever work for Society
172
was robbed and locked in the trunk of his car, in his first week."
To operate a taxi in Miami, as in every other major city, one
must have a license. 173 Each license (or "medallion") allows a
person to operate one car. 174 These medallions are issued by Dade
County's Consumer Services Department (CSD). 175 CSD has
issued 1,856 such medallions. 176 The four largest cab companies
control between 34 and 49 percent of the cab market.1 77 For about
twenty years, the county heavily restricted the taxi market, but in
1998, a new ordinance provided for the issuance of twenty-five new
taxi licenses over the next five years, using a lottery system. 1 78
Starting in June 2004, new licenses will be granted every year to
keep a 1:1000 taxicab to population ratio. 179 Entry in the license
lottery costs $400, and this fee is non-refundable.180 The winner of
the lottery must then pay $15,000 for a license.1 8' All licensed
taxis must be school bus yellow.1 82 A licensee who drives a taxi
that is not yellow can lose the licenses on other taxis owned by the
licensee even if those taxis are yellow.1 83 All rates are regulated,
and drivers are not even technically allowed to accept tips.184
When deciding what rates to allow a taxi company to charge, the
CSD does not consider any costs incurred in the acquisition of a
license. 185 Further, the ordinance sets forth vehicle standards
requiring, among other things, hubcaps, air conditioners, and a
functioning interior light. 186 Drivers are not allowed to use a car
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See OXENHANDLER, supra note 164, at 118.

174.
175.
2002),
176.
177.

See id. at 118.
Restrepo v. Miami-Dade County, 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D. 184 (S.D. Fla.
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6932 at *3.
Id. at *2.
Carol Marbin Miller, Taken for a Ride? Taxi Drivers Renew Fight over

Ordinance They Say Favors Cab Owners, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Mar. 30,

2000. at 1.
178. Restrepo, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6932. at *3.
179. Id.

180. CODE OF METRO. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, ch. 31, art. II, § 31-82(o) (2003),
available at
http:/Iivepublish.municode.com/4/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=mainj.htm&vid=10620.
181. Restrepo, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6932. at *3.
182. Id. at *6-*8 (giving an exception for "underserved taxicab service areas").
183. CODE OF METRO. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, ch. 31, art. II, § 31-85(a) (2003),
available at
http://livepublish.municode.com/4lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=mainj.htm&vid=10620.
184. Id. § 31-87(B).
185. Id. § 31-87(C).
186. Id. § 31-89(a).
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more than five years old, and they are required to complete a
187
county prescribed apprentice program.
A licensed taxi driver must drive one shift per day, at an
average of five days per week.18 8 A licensed driver cannot transfer
a medallion to anyone else for the first five years and, after that,
transfers can only be made with permission from the county. 189
But a medallion holder can give his medallion to an "immediate
family member" or anyone meeting residency requirements who is
not a member of a corporation already holding a taxi license. 190 A
medallion-holder can also lease out the medallions, and as a
result, many taxi drivers in Miami do not own, but lease
medallions at rates of sometimes more than $500 per week.' 9' As
one driver put it: 'You'll spend up to Thursday making that
money. Then, you're forced to work the weekend if you want any
money for yourself."192 In the early 1980s, Walter Williams
commented on the devastating impact of taxicab license
regulations, explaining that:
A free market in the taxicab industry will not produce a
panacea for the disadvantaged. However, it is one small way
to upward mobility for some, which has been cut off by
government. As such, it demonstrates again one of the key
differences'between disadvantaged blacks and disadvantaged
ethnic groups of the past. A poor illiterate Italian, for
example, arriving in our cities in 1925 or 1930 could, if he had
ambition and industry, go out and buy a car and write TAXI on
it. Thus he could provide upward mobility for his family.
Today a poor person of any race would find that industry and
ambition are not enough, if he sought the same path to
upward mobility. He would find the path barricaded by a
license costing $20, $30, or $60 thousand-a considerable
barrier.193
Taxi regulation has a profound effect on the underprivileged
who want nothing more than to earn a living for themselves and
their families; it also affects customers, who are often poor
187. Id. § 31-89(f).
188. Id. § 31-82(q)(5).
189. Id. § 31-82(r).
190. Id. § 31-82(r)(5).
191. Francis X. Gilpin, Taxi Stand, WEEKLY PLANET (Sarasota), Jan. 10, 2002,
http://www.weeklyplanet.com/2002-01/news-feature.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2003); see also Rebecca Wakefield, Calling All Cabbies: Battered by a Corrupt
Industry, Miami's Independent Taxi Drivers Consider Unionizing, MIAMI NEW
TIMES,

Oct.

25,

2000,

http://www.miaminewtimes.com/issues/2001-10-

25/metro2.html/l/indexlhtml (discussing the difficult circumstances taxi drivers
face) (last visited Sept. 16, 2003).
192. Gilpin, supra note 191.
193. WILLIAMS, supra note 142, at 86-87.
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minorities themselves. For instance, the new requirement that all
cars be less than five years old poses a real threat to the Society
Cab Company. Many of Society's cars are older than five years,
and its customers cannot afford to pay the higher prices Society
Cab Company would need to charge to buy new cars. 194 So far,
constitutional challenges to Florida's taxi regulations have met
with no success.195
In Colorado, one group of would-be cab drivers decided to
defend their right to earn a living when their application for a taxi
license was denied. 196 The license process required the petitioner,
Leroy Jones, to prove to the State Public Utilities Commission that
there needed to be a new taxi company in Denver, and obtain a
"certificate of public convenience and necessity." 197 When Jones
applied for a certificate, the other taxi companies in Denver,
fearful of increased competition, protested to the Commission,
which then denied the certificate. 198 Jones sued, but the court held
that his right to earn a living was not a "fundamental
constitutionally-protected value,"'199 and ruled that, under the
200
rational basis test, the court could do nothing for Jones.
Fortunately, the State Legislature recognized the injustice, and
changed the law. 20 1 Today Leroy Jones is operating the company,
20 2
which he has renamed Freedom Cabs.
The drivers in Ricketts v. City of New York did not fare as
20 3
well.
Hector Ricketts established Queens Van Plan Inc., a
community-based "jitney" service, which provided rides in areas
not served by taxi companies, or for riders who could not afford the
higher taxi fares. 204 Ricketts employed fifty-three people and

194. County Relaxes the Rules for Inner-City Cab Service, SUN-SENTINEL, June
27, 1999, at 9B. Society was ultimately exempted from the regulations. Id.
195. See Restrepo v. Miami-Dade County, 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D. 184 (S.D.
Fla. 2002), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6932 at *3; American V.I.P. Limousines, Inc. v.
Dade County Comm'rs, 757 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1991); State ex rel. Hosack v.
Yocum, 136 Fla. 246 (1939).
196. Jones v. Temmer, 829 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1993), vacated by 57 F.3d 921
(10th Cir. 1995).
197. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 723-6-2.12, 723-6-3.6 (1984) quoted in Temmer, 829
F. Supp. at 1234.
198. Temmer, 829 F. Supp. at 1230.
199. Id. at 1234.
200. Id. at 1237.
201. Jones v. Temmer, 57 F.3d 921, 922 (10th Cir. 1995).
202. Steven M. Simpson, Judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6
CHAP. L. REV. 173, 196 (2003).
203. 722 N.Y.S.2d 25 (2001), appeal dismissed, 98 N.Y.2d 692 (2002).
204. Mona Charen, Van Service Imbroglio, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at A14.
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actually managed to get a license. 205 However, he soon found
himself the target of a campaign by New York bus and taxi
companies that sought to enforce ordinances prohibiting vans from
picking up passengers from the sidewalk and from using bus
routes. 206 This effectively meant Ricketts could not operate on
New York City streets. 207 He sued, arguing that this regulatory
system unfairly benefited the bus companies by depriving him of
20
his right to earn a living, but the court ruled against him.
The holdings of Temmer and Ricketts are even more striking
when compared with an English case from three hundred years
ago, Robinson v. Watkins.20 9 There, London carriage drivers
challenged a law that prohibited driving a carriage without a
license, and permitted only four hundred licenses to be issued in
London. 210 "[Ilt cannot be denied that a by-law, made to prevent a
nuisance, is good," said the coachmen's lawyer. 211 Requiring
licenses, the lawyer argued, "check[s] and controul[s] that freedom
and liberty, which every man hath by the common law of this
...
212
.
kingdom, for the exercising of a lawful imployment
Apparently courts today are not nearly so concerned about the
right to earn a living through fair competition.
V. Where Do We Go From Here?
It is a travesty that a half-century after the government's
regulatory power almost crushed the Baton Rouge bus boycott,
that same power continues to obstruct real racial equality. In the
1860s, Abraham Lincoln described slavery as
the same old serpent that says you work and I eat, you toil and
I will enjoy the fruits of it. Turn i[t] whatever way you willwhether it come from the mouth of a King, an excuse for
enslaving the people of his country, or from the mouth of men
of one race as a reason for enslaving the men of another race,
113
it is all the same old serpent ....
Occupational licensing is the new skin of that serpent.
By
205. Id.
206. See generally JOHN CARLISLE, NAT'L CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH,
REGULATORY
ABUSE KILLING
EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY
NATIONWIDE
(1998),

http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA219.html.
207. See generally id.
208. Ricketts, 722 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
209. 90 Eng. Rep. 165 (K.B. 1693).
210. Id. at 165.
211. Id. at 169.
212. Id.
213. Speech at Chicago, Illinois (July 10, 1858) in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 500 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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restricting competition, established taxi companies can raise their
prices, leaving customers with few alternatives; these companies
get rich by making it illegal to shop somewhere else. 21 4 They thus
increase their profits not only at the expense of consumers, but at
the expense of people like Leroy Jones, who just want to compete
215
fairly.
One of the primary duties of our courts is to protect
minorities against the tyranny of the majority. 216 But the legal
theory of "rational basis scrutiny" is dangerous because it leads
courts to abandon that duty in precisely those situations that are
most important to the economically disadvantaged. When the
court uses this level of analysis it is assuming that the political
process will somehow inherently protect the rights of minorities.
That assumption is a blatant fiction, as is proven by the fact that
courts apply strict scrutiny when the law touches upon something
217
that courts consider important, such as free speech rights.
Courts are right to impose strict scrutiny in such cases, and in
doing so courts have done much to help the progress of race
relations in this country. Those of us who are concerned with the
economic opportunities for minorities believe this strict scrutiny
analysis should also be used when government infringes on
economic liberty. Even when government is not acting with overt
racial bias, the effects of infringements have always fallen hardest
on minority groups who lack the political power to take over the
218
bureaucracy or to convince the bureaucracy to change its ways.
As James Madison once told Thomas Jefferson,
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the
Community, and the invasion of private rights is cheifly [sic]

to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to
the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
mere instrument of the major number of
Government is the
219
the constituents.

214. Cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion,
96 YALE L.J. 209, 293 n.132 (1986) (describing how the taxicab market can be
affected by competition).
215. Id.
216. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 351 (James Madison) (J. E. Cooke
ed., 1961) ("It is of great importance in a republic ... to guard one part of the
If a majority be united by a
society against the injustice of the other part ....
common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.").
217. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 660 (1925) (assuming freedom of
speech is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
218. See Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal
Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 732 (1998).
219. Letter from James Madison (Oct. 17, 1788), in MADISON, supra note 59, at
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Since bureaucracy resists innovation, it is always the enemy of
those who hope to rise in society, but who lack political
influence. 220 Courts ought to apply a high standard of scrutiny to
such decisions, in order to stop the serpent from biting.
When the administrative state was first being created at
the beginning of the twentieth century, Max Weber explained that
"[blureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for
carrying through the principle of specializing administrative
functions according to purely objective considerations . . . [with
business being discharged] according to calculable rules and
'without regard for persons."' 221 The reality has been the opposite.
At its best, bureaucracy stands in the way of innovation and
entrepreneurialism of people like Hector Ricketts or Dr. Cornwell.
At its worst, bureaucracy provides the political majority with a
powerful weapon against the minority. 222 That weapon was
unleashed against the boycotts of 1953 and 1955. The ordinance
that caused Dr. King trouble in Montgomery, for instance,
required taxis to charge at least forty-five cents per ride, 223 which
no doubt kept many people on the city's segregated buses who
would have chosen otherwise, given the opportunity. And by
outlawing alternative transportation, the city prevented would-be
entrepreneurs from starting up non-segregated alternatives.

421.
220. See, e.g., Hench, supra note 218, at 730-31. Williams describes another
problem with licensing statutes called the "Cadillac effect." WILLIAMS, supra note
142, at 97. Because licensing laws increase the cost of providing a service, they
ensure high quality services to those with high incomes. Id. The increased service
costs make it more difficult for the poor to hire labor, which encourages the poor to
Id.
Thus, "there is a significant relationship between
engage in self-help.
occupational licensing and the number of accidental deaths by electrocution .... "
Id. Since such laws make the services of electricians more expensive, people are
more willing "to undertake electrical wiring tasks and risk electrocution in the
process." Id.
221. MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196,

215 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds., 1946) (emphasis omitted).
222. An example of this powerful weapon is eminent domain. See, e.g., Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). Lower
class, minority neighborhoods are far more likely to be condemned to make way for
influential corporations to locate their businesses. See Timothy Sandefur, A
Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California: A Rationale for
Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of "Public Use," 32 SW. U. L. REV. 569, 598-599
(2003) (arguing that poor minority landowners are often at the mercy of
redevelopment agencies).
223. BATON

ROUGE,
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§

10:210(2)
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2003),

http:/Ilivepublish.municode.comli /lpext.dll?f=templates&fn-mainj.htm&vid=10107 (last visited Sept. 25, 2003). The Ordinance now allows taxi
drivers to charge "up to thirty-two dollars ($32.00) per hour (two-hour minimum);
eight dollars ($8.00) for each additional quarter hour, or fraction thereof." Id.
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It is impossible to tell today how much innovation is stifled
by bureaucratic harassment. In many parts of the United States,
the pursuit of happiness is rendered a sham by government
regulations that cost jobs, increase prices, and put the property
224
rights of minorities at the mercy of the majority.
Government regulatory power is the most effective tool
proponents of segregation have ever had. Commentators rightly
point out that what they call "transportation racism" is "just as
real as the racism that is found in the housing industry,
educational institutions, the employment arena, and the judicial
system." 225 But by failing to address the profoundly negative
impact that government regulation has on the social mobility of
racial groups-like taxi licensing laws, which perpetuate
critics seem to endorse the
transportation racism 22 6-these
prevailing belief that discrimination can only be solved by
government intervention. Critics acknowledge that "[p]lanning
agencies, such as the Atlanta Regional Commission and the
Georgia Department of Transportation, have been unwilling to
'bite the bullet' needed to address the mounting traffic, air quality,
and cross-jurisdictional land use problems associated with the
region's transportation needs." 227 Surely it is more important to
emphasize the way government regulation of the transportation
market consistently deprives underprivileged minorities of
economic opportunity. Although in some cases government action
can help alleviate the problems of racial discrimination, 228 such
intervention can just as often work in the opposite direction.
When government has the power to distribute economic benefits,
the government itself becomes an asset that factions in society
seek to control. 229 In the resulting scramble for that power, racial
minorities are always at a distinct disadvantage.
An increasing number of lawyers, including such famous
names as Laurence Tribe, have argued for a restoration of the
right to earn a living because the current law "overlooks the
224. See generally David E. Bernstein, Roots of the 'Underclass" The Decline of
Laissez-FaireJurisprudenceand the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L.
REV. 85 (1993) (examining how Black workers have historically been negatively
effected by union-sponsored labor legislation).
225. Robert D. Bullard et al., The Costs and Consequences of Suburban Sprawl:
The Case of Metro Atlanta, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 967 (2001).
226. See id. at 966-67.
227. Id. at 998.
228. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (finding restrictive
covenants preventing homeowners from selling property to Blacks invalid under
Equal Protection and therefore unenforceable by state courts).
229. See supra Part III.B and accompanying footnotes.
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importance of property and contract in protecting the dispossessed
no less than the established; it forgets the political impotence of
the isolated job-seeker who has been fenced out of an occupation..
. ."230 Some courts appear to have heard this call and are paying
closer attention to the tendency of interest groups to use
occupational licensing to benefit themselves at the expense of
others. For instance, a federal court recently stopped the State of
231
Tennessee from shutting down a minority-run coffin retailer.
Even though the plaintiff, Rev. Nathaniel Craigmiles, did not want
to run a funeral parlor, but only sell a box, state law required him
to have a funeral director's license, which required fees of several
thousand dollars and years of classes in subjects such as
embalming. 232 The State's lawyers made the usual argument that
the law protected consumers, but the court rejected that
reasoning, saying "Tennessee's justifications for the 1972
amendment come close to striking us with 'the force of a five-weekold, unrefrigerated dead fish."'233 Although the court shied away
from discussing the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 234 this case
represents great progress.
In addition, some community groups are also making heroic
efforts to bring entrepreneurialism to the neighborhoods where it
is needed most. The Congress of National Black Churches (CNBC)
has established a Community and Economic Development
Program that trains would-be entrepreneurs in starting and
running their own businesses, and gives them seed money grants
to start operating. 235
CNBC's chairman, Bishop Roy L.H.
Winbush, explained, "'[y]ou sure can't turn to the government to
do this job ....And if the church doesn't do it, we're going to have
problems that we can't do anything about." 236 Rev. James R.
Samuel, pastor of the AME Zion Church in Charlotte, North
Carolina, compiled a list of church members who run their own
businesses, and every Sunday he calls one of these entrepreneurs
230. LAURENCE H.
ed. 1988).

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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15-13, at 1374

231. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
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233. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 225 (quoting Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling
Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988)).
234. Id. at 229.
235. Laurie Goodstein, From Pulpit, Pitches for the Material World: Some Black
Congregations Are Using Church to Push Entrepreneurship,WASH. POST, Dec. 26,

1996, at Al.
236. Id.

2004]

CAN YOU GET THERE FROMHERE?

237
The
to the pulpit to give a short talk about his or her business.
agents, and
list includes painters, accountants, real estate
238
hairdressers-all licensed occupations in Arkansas.
Bishop Winbush, Rev. Samuel, Dr. Cornwell, Leroy Jones,
and other entrepreneurs are not asking for government favors or
handouts. They simply want to be left alone to earn a living
without unreasonable government interference. But too often,
these attempts to foster community development, which ought to
be commended, are instead shut down by politically powerful
groups seeking to dominate trade to the exclusion of others.
Occupational licensing inhibits competition among painters,
accountants, real estate agents, hairdressers, and more. It may
seem strange to use a phrase such as "forestry cartel," but it is
it is illegal to practice forestry without a license in
true:
Arkansas. 239 These licensing laws are frequently passed in the
name of the government's "power to safeguard the public health
[is] economic.
and safety. But the real motivation, or part of it,
240
competition."
control
to
anxious
[are]
groups
Trade

Conclusion
"The economic highway to power has few entry lanes for
Negroes," wrote Dr. King in 1967.241 Opening those entry lanes
means stopping the monopoly power that political groups wield in
United States law and restoring the right to earn a living as a
fundamental right under the Constitution. Such action requires
overturning the Slaughter-House Cases242 and restoring the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to its rightful place. It requires
ending the reign of the "rational basis test." Justice William 0.
Douglas called the right to earn a living
the most precious liberty that man possesses. Man has indeed
as much right to work as he has to live, to be free, to own
property .... It does many men little good to stay alive and

free and propertied, if they cannot work. To work means to
eat. It also means to live . .

.

. [S]o the question here is not

must give, but rather what it may not take
what government
24 3
away.

237. Id.
238. See ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 17-25-103, 17-12-106, 17-42-301, 17-20-301 (2003).
239. ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-31-105 (2003).
240. FRIEDMAN, supra note 42, at 399.
241. WASHINGTON, supra note 26, at 600.
242. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
243. Barsky v. Board of Regents of University, 347 U.S. 442, 472-73 (1954)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Unfortunately, the government violates that right every day
in order to serve political constituencies. If the right to pursue
happiness is to be accorded to all people, government must be
made to serve the actual public interest, not the private interest of
politically powerful factions trying to insulate themselves from
competition.
At an Independence Day celebration in 1852, Frederick
Douglass told his audience that, "interpreted as it ought to be
interpreted, the Constitution is a GLORIOUS LIBERTY
DOCUMENT.244 Such an interpretation requires higher scrutiny
for economic regulations. Economic liberty and private property
are fundamental rights of every United States citizen, and the
continuing struggle for civil rights must place the right to earn a
living at the forefront of the agenda.

244. Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is The Fourth of July? Speech at a
meeting of the Rochester Ladies' Anti-Slavery Society (July 5, 1852),
http://douglassarchives.org/doug-alO.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).

